1 00:00:01,340 --> 00:00:02,689 Zurich airport, 2 00:00:02,690 --> 00:00:05,089 November 2001. 3 00:00:05,090 --> 00:00:08,379 Crossair flight 3597 is one of the few planes 4 00:00:08,380 --> 00:00:09,959 left to land. 5 00:00:09,960 --> 00:00:12,809 The commander was flying out of Zurich 6 00:00:12,810 --> 00:00:15,279 for the last 20 years. 7 00:00:15,280 --> 00:00:17,143 He was really used to this airport. 8 00:00:18,290 --> 00:00:19,669 The lone controller in the tower 9 00:00:19,670 --> 00:00:21,349 tracks the approach. 10 00:00:21,350 --> 00:00:23,913 Approach runway 28 for you. 11 00:00:24,790 --> 00:00:26,009 I have ground contact. 12 00:00:26,010 --> 00:00:27,759 We're continuing on. 13 00:00:27,760 --> 00:00:29,209 Crossair 3597, 14 00:00:29,210 --> 00:00:31,186 continue speed reduction to final approach speed. 15 00:00:31,187 --> 00:00:32,189 But for some reason 16 00:00:32,190 --> 00:00:34,409 the crew can't find the runway. 17 00:00:34,410 --> 00:00:35,389 Damn. 18 00:00:35,390 --> 00:00:37,693 He said he saw the runway 1.3 miles. 19 00:00:38,910 --> 00:00:41,160 And the flight ends in disaster. 20 00:00:44,215 --> 00:00:45,419 Crossair 3597, 21 00:00:45,420 --> 00:00:46,449 this is Zurich tower. 22 00:00:46,450 --> 00:00:47,282 Do you copy? 23 00:00:47,283 --> 00:00:48,609 We have a possible emergency... 24 00:00:48,610 --> 00:00:49,749 He collided with a hill, 25 00:00:49,750 --> 00:00:51,829 so obviously he was too low. 26 00:00:51,830 --> 00:00:54,189 A terrible mistake sent a passenger jet 27 00:00:54,190 --> 00:00:55,989 dangerously off course, 28 00:00:55,990 --> 00:00:58,269 killing 24 people. 29 00:00:58,270 --> 00:01:01,519 The clues will lead investigators to a trained professional 30 00:01:01,520 --> 00:01:03,884 with an astonishing past. 31 00:01:09,227 --> 00:01:10,477 Mayday mayday 32 00:01:39,020 --> 00:01:41,129 Crossair flight 3597 33 00:01:41,130 --> 00:01:44,293 is cruising at 27,000 feet above Germany. 34 00:01:45,550 --> 00:01:48,169 As the autopilot flies the plane, 35 00:01:48,170 --> 00:01:51,719 the crew begins reviewing procedures for their landing. 36 00:01:51,720 --> 00:01:52,609 According to the report, 37 00:01:52,610 --> 00:01:54,903 the apron and taxi ways are wet. 38 00:01:55,820 --> 00:01:57,869 Breaking action's not specified. 39 00:01:57,870 --> 00:02:00,259 So the friction report is missing? 40 00:02:00,260 --> 00:02:01,569 Indeed. 41 00:02:01,570 --> 00:02:04,849 That usually means they haven't been out to check lately. 42 00:02:04,850 --> 00:02:05,683 Indeed. 43 00:02:14,060 --> 00:02:15,509 It's the last flight of the day 44 00:02:15,510 --> 00:02:17,363 on this busy European route. 45 00:02:21,210 --> 00:02:23,259 The 660 kilometer journey 46 00:02:23,260 --> 00:02:25,009 from Berlin south to Zurich 47 00:02:25,010 --> 00:02:26,653 takes only an hour and a half. 48 00:02:28,120 --> 00:02:30,709 There are many empty seats on board. 49 00:02:30,710 --> 00:02:34,073 A group of 21 passengers never showed up for the flight. 50 00:02:37,140 --> 00:02:39,309 Internet entrepreneur, Peter Hogenkamp, 51 00:02:39,310 --> 00:02:41,399 is returning from a business trip in Germany 52 00:02:41,400 --> 00:02:43,593 with his partner, Jacqueline Badran. 53 00:02:44,460 --> 00:02:47,139 On that day, we wanted to take the train, 54 00:02:47,140 --> 00:02:49,269 but we had to be in Zurich 55 00:02:49,270 --> 00:02:52,229 for the opening ceremony of the trade show, 56 00:02:52,230 --> 00:02:53,169 so we decided okay, 57 00:02:53,170 --> 00:02:55,133 so we need to go by plane. 58 00:02:56,841 --> 00:02:58,799 I have got to get some sleep. 59 00:02:58,800 --> 00:03:00,179 It had been a very busy day, 60 00:03:00,180 --> 00:03:03,483 so we were very tired when we arrived at the airport. 61 00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:05,609 Among the passengers 62 00:03:05,610 --> 00:03:07,592 is the girl band Passion Fruit, 63 00:03:07,593 --> 00:03:10,283 Germany's answer to The Spice Girls. 64 00:03:11,120 --> 00:03:13,049 They're on their way to perform the last show 65 00:03:13,050 --> 00:03:13,953 of a concert tour. 66 00:03:15,810 --> 00:03:18,589 I was shocked when suddenly all the Passion Fruits, 67 00:03:18,590 --> 00:03:20,559 all the three of them are coming over, 68 00:03:20,560 --> 00:03:22,739 and they were sitting right in front of us. 69 00:03:22,740 --> 00:03:23,690 Just what I need. 70 00:03:27,570 --> 00:03:32,489 Flight 3597 is an Avro 146 airliner. 71 00:03:32,490 --> 00:03:34,379 It's a British-made jet popular 72 00:03:34,380 --> 00:03:36,683 with regional airlines like Crossair. 73 00:03:38,910 --> 00:03:41,779 Captain Hans Ulrich Lutz is in command. 74 00:03:41,780 --> 00:03:44,649 He's been with the airline for more than 22 years, 75 00:03:44,650 --> 00:03:47,249 having served as a pilot and as an instructor. 76 00:03:47,250 --> 00:03:49,769 So, tell me about the runway 77 00:03:49,770 --> 00:03:51,053 and the conditions. 78 00:03:52,130 --> 00:03:54,079 Overcast with light snowfall, 79 00:03:54,080 --> 00:03:54,912 visibility... 80 00:03:54,913 --> 00:03:56,589 First Officer Stefan Lohrer 81 00:03:56,590 --> 00:03:58,719 is a newcomer to the airline. 82 00:03:58,720 --> 00:04:02,469 He's had his pilot's license for just a year and a half. 83 00:04:02,470 --> 00:04:05,243 He was hired by Crossair right out of flight school. 84 00:04:13,280 --> 00:04:15,929 The Passion Fruits were being quite noisy. 85 00:04:15,930 --> 00:04:16,762 They were excited, 86 00:04:16,763 --> 00:04:18,749 I think they went from one gig to the other. 87 00:04:18,750 --> 00:04:20,949 So they were still in their stage clothes. 88 00:04:20,950 --> 00:04:22,659 I said oh my god, 89 00:04:22,660 --> 00:04:24,479 do I really need this? 90 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:26,557 Can't I just sleep? 91 00:04:29,130 --> 00:04:30,580 It's probably okay to move. 92 00:04:32,750 --> 00:04:34,939 We decided to move back a few rows 93 00:04:34,940 --> 00:04:37,679 and change the side where we were sitting, 94 00:04:37,680 --> 00:04:40,093 so we were in a very quiet area then. 95 00:04:46,206 --> 00:04:48,338 Crossair 3597, 96 00:04:48,339 --> 00:04:51,219 clear to flight level 160. 97 00:04:51,220 --> 00:04:53,859 The flight is slightly behind schedule. 98 00:04:53,860 --> 00:04:57,209 It's due to land in Zurich in less than half an hour. 99 00:04:57,210 --> 00:04:58,369 According to the latest information, 100 00:04:58,370 --> 00:04:59,933 we'll be using runway 14. 101 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:03,483 What kind of approach? 102 00:05:05,342 --> 00:05:07,370 ILS approach. 103 00:05:07,371 --> 00:05:08,204 Okay. 104 00:05:09,653 --> 00:05:12,469 An ILS, or instrument landing system approach, 105 00:05:12,470 --> 00:05:14,519 means the pilots will be guided to the runway 106 00:05:14,520 --> 00:05:17,419 by radio signals beamed from the airport. 107 00:05:17,420 --> 00:05:22,209 And a decision altitude of 1602 feet. 108 00:05:22,210 --> 00:05:25,119 Call me 100 above minimums. 109 00:05:25,120 --> 00:05:27,153 Okay, I'll call 100 above minimums. 110 00:05:29,110 --> 00:05:31,039 The plane's sophisticated computers 111 00:05:31,040 --> 00:05:33,213 will do most of the work getting them down. 112 00:05:36,570 --> 00:05:39,719 At Zurich airport, the weather is getting worse. 113 00:05:39,720 --> 00:05:40,829 It's snowing, 114 00:05:40,830 --> 00:05:42,992 and visibility is dropping. 115 00:05:42,993 --> 00:05:44,169 Crossair 3191, 116 00:05:44,170 --> 00:05:46,709 turn left heading 150. 117 00:05:46,710 --> 00:05:47,589 In the tower, 118 00:05:47,590 --> 00:05:50,143 controllers have started a nightly routine. 119 00:05:51,560 --> 00:05:53,639 A supervisor sends out a message 120 00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:55,999 notifying crews that runway 14 121 00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:58,049 is being taken out of service 122 00:05:58,050 --> 00:06:00,193 because of a controversial new law. 123 00:06:03,620 --> 00:06:06,419 Planes landing on runway 14 must fly over 124 00:06:06,420 --> 00:06:08,429 Germany on their approach. 125 00:06:08,430 --> 00:06:10,629 But people in Germany have long complained 126 00:06:10,630 --> 00:06:11,673 about the noise. 127 00:06:13,210 --> 00:06:15,279 Because of the political issue, 128 00:06:15,280 --> 00:06:19,419 airplanes had to fly over Switzerland 129 00:06:19,420 --> 00:06:22,709 in their final descent to the airport of Zurich 130 00:06:22,710 --> 00:06:23,733 for noise reasons. 131 00:06:30,130 --> 00:06:31,879 There was no other operational 132 00:06:31,880 --> 00:06:33,673 or weather reasons whatsoever. 133 00:06:34,806 --> 00:06:36,103 It was purely political. 134 00:06:37,310 --> 00:06:39,429 Switzerland has agreed to shut down 135 00:06:39,430 --> 00:06:41,689 runway 14 after 10 pm 136 00:06:41,690 --> 00:06:44,549 to keep landing planes out of German airspace, 137 00:06:44,550 --> 00:06:46,623 and use runway 28 instead. 138 00:06:50,740 --> 00:06:53,163 The crew hasn't received this information yet. 139 00:06:54,340 --> 00:06:57,403 But First Officer Lohrer is familiar with the new rule. 140 00:06:59,140 --> 00:07:01,173 Should I ask if it's still runway 14? 141 00:07:04,521 --> 00:07:05,923 It's almost 10 o'clock. 142 00:07:07,320 --> 00:07:09,683 Yes, I'm pretty sure it's still 14. 143 00:07:13,830 --> 00:07:15,016 Zurich approach. 144 00:07:15,017 --> 00:07:16,779 Crossair 3597. 145 00:07:16,780 --> 00:07:18,609 Please confirm the approach in use 146 00:07:18,610 --> 00:07:19,707 is the ILS 14. 147 00:07:21,886 --> 00:07:24,489 Crossair 3597, you're identified. 148 00:07:24,490 --> 00:07:27,009 It will be a V-O-R-D-M-E. 149 00:07:27,010 --> 00:07:29,293 Approach runway 28 for you. 150 00:07:31,070 --> 00:07:32,719 Hell. 151 00:07:32,720 --> 00:07:33,903 What next? 152 00:07:35,030 --> 00:07:36,763 Okay, fine. 153 00:07:38,910 --> 00:07:40,399 Unlike runway 14, 154 00:07:40,400 --> 00:07:43,039 with its sophisticated instrument landing system, 155 00:07:43,040 --> 00:07:46,503 runway 28 is not equipped for ILS landings. 156 00:07:47,810 --> 00:07:50,923 Instead it has a less accurate navigational system. 157 00:07:52,060 --> 00:07:53,123 It's called VORDME. 158 00:07:55,508 --> 00:07:58,059 A radio beacon sends information to an aircraft 159 00:07:58,060 --> 00:08:00,069 about its distance from the runway, 160 00:08:00,070 --> 00:08:02,039 and whether it's left or right of it. 161 00:08:02,040 --> 00:08:04,883 It provides no guidance on the planes altitude. 162 00:08:07,320 --> 00:08:09,969 Pilots would rather not make VOR approaches, 163 00:08:09,970 --> 00:08:12,770 because the place a greater workload on the flight crew. 164 00:08:15,990 --> 00:08:18,349 He would always prefer an ILS approach 165 00:08:18,350 --> 00:08:23,279 because he gets guidance on the approach slope. 166 00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:26,999 He can also use his autopilot to guide him down 167 00:08:27,000 --> 00:08:29,779 literally on ground to the runway. 168 00:08:29,780 --> 00:08:32,529 Because of its less precise technology, 169 00:08:32,530 --> 00:08:35,129 runway 28 was rarely used for landings 170 00:08:35,130 --> 00:08:36,723 before the new noise law. 171 00:08:41,510 --> 00:08:45,179 Okay then, re briefing for runway 28. 172 00:08:45,180 --> 00:08:48,329 That will be chart 13-2. 173 00:08:48,330 --> 00:08:49,929 Now Captain Lutz abandons 174 00:08:49,930 --> 00:08:52,469 the ILS approach he was planning, 175 00:08:52,470 --> 00:08:54,069 and prepares his first officer 176 00:08:54,070 --> 00:08:56,103 for the new non precision approach. 177 00:08:57,972 --> 00:09:00,689 Are you familiar with the 28 approach? 178 00:09:00,690 --> 00:09:02,590 Yes, I've done it a couple of times. 179 00:09:03,690 --> 00:09:05,799 The crew goes over every detail 180 00:09:05,800 --> 00:09:08,220 of how they will approach Zurich airport. 181 00:09:09,290 --> 00:09:11,213 East 6000 feet. 182 00:09:16,010 --> 00:09:17,429 There are only a few planes 183 00:09:17,430 --> 00:09:19,643 left to land tonight. - 3597. 184 00:09:20,570 --> 00:09:22,849 Including flight 3597 185 00:09:22,850 --> 00:09:25,443 and two other Crossair flights just ahead of it. 186 00:09:27,240 --> 00:09:29,029 As the aircraft approach the runway, 187 00:09:29,030 --> 00:09:31,053 controllers need to keep them apart. 188 00:09:33,100 --> 00:09:34,509 Crossair 3597, 189 00:09:34,510 --> 00:09:38,149 reduce speed to 180 or less. 190 00:09:38,150 --> 00:09:41,323 Speed 180 or less, Crossair 3597. 191 00:09:42,320 --> 00:09:44,339 Captain Lutz makes the final turn 192 00:09:44,340 --> 00:09:46,689 to line his jet up with the runway. 193 00:09:46,690 --> 00:09:48,813 160 knots. 194 00:09:52,330 --> 00:09:53,959 The plane is now in the thick 195 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:56,073 of the heavy weather surrounding Zurich. 196 00:09:59,280 --> 00:10:00,129 At the airport, 197 00:10:00,130 --> 00:10:01,949 the second last Crossair flight 198 00:10:01,950 --> 00:10:03,953 touches down on runway 28. 199 00:10:05,150 --> 00:10:08,499 Now with only flight 3597 to land, 200 00:10:08,500 --> 00:10:11,163 the supervisor decides to head home early. 201 00:10:13,220 --> 00:10:15,049 The controller handling the aircraft 202 00:10:15,050 --> 00:10:17,393 is the only controller left in the tower. 203 00:10:20,689 --> 00:10:22,009 Crossair 3597, 204 00:10:22,010 --> 00:10:24,643 continue speed reduction to final approach speed. 205 00:10:27,630 --> 00:10:30,949 Zurich tower this is Crossair 3891. 206 00:10:30,950 --> 00:10:32,529 She gets a report from the plane 207 00:10:32,530 --> 00:10:33,889 that just landed. 208 00:10:33,890 --> 00:10:36,349 Visibility approaching 28 was borderline. 209 00:10:36,350 --> 00:10:39,363 We could only see the runway from 1.3 miles out. 210 00:10:40,260 --> 00:10:43,689 But Captain Lutz knows Zurich airport well. 211 00:10:43,690 --> 00:10:46,339 He continues towards the runway. 212 00:10:46,340 --> 00:10:47,539 Gear down. 213 00:10:47,540 --> 00:10:49,449 The plane begins the final stage 214 00:10:49,450 --> 00:10:50,373 of its approach. 215 00:10:51,540 --> 00:10:52,809 Cab and crew, 216 00:10:52,810 --> 00:10:53,810 prepare for landing. 217 00:10:58,290 --> 00:11:00,909 Captain Lutz begins slowing the jet, 218 00:11:00,910 --> 00:11:02,833 and puts it into a steep descent. 219 00:11:10,700 --> 00:11:12,033 Six miles is checked. 220 00:11:13,350 --> 00:11:14,509 Yes. 221 00:11:14,510 --> 00:11:15,803 Flaps three three. 222 00:11:18,870 --> 00:11:20,320 Flaps three three selected. 223 00:11:21,730 --> 00:11:23,703 Final check. 224 00:11:24,670 --> 00:11:25,883 Confirm three greens. 225 00:11:27,370 --> 00:11:28,843 Is checked. 226 00:11:29,740 --> 00:11:32,623 116 knots. 227 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:36,750 The descent gets even steeper. 228 00:11:40,050 --> 00:11:41,723 Full flaps set. 229 00:11:42,970 --> 00:11:43,803 Checked. 230 00:11:44,780 --> 00:11:47,559 Flight 3597 is about three minutes 231 00:11:47,560 --> 00:11:48,393 from the runway. 232 00:11:50,920 --> 00:11:54,333 Captain Lutz expects it to come into view any second now. 233 00:12:01,100 --> 00:12:02,219 100 above. 234 00:12:02,220 --> 00:12:03,620 Do we have ground contact? 235 00:12:06,420 --> 00:12:07,253 Yes. 236 00:12:12,680 --> 00:12:15,430 Passengers prepare themselves for landing. 237 00:12:16,370 --> 00:12:19,029 We were pretty close to the airport, 238 00:12:19,030 --> 00:12:22,529 so we think okay, this is going smoothly. 239 00:12:22,530 --> 00:12:24,299 But it was dark and it was snowing, 240 00:12:24,300 --> 00:12:26,053 so we couldn't see anything. 241 00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:29,152 In the tower, 242 00:12:29,153 --> 00:12:30,759 the controller monitors the flight 243 00:12:30,760 --> 00:12:32,910 to make sure it's lined up with the runway. 244 00:12:34,410 --> 00:12:37,433 Crossair 3597, clear to land runway 28. 245 00:12:43,040 --> 00:12:45,049 Two four the minimum. 246 00:12:45,050 --> 00:12:46,069 Two four. 247 00:12:46,070 --> 00:12:48,229 The flight has hit decision height 248 00:12:48,230 --> 00:12:50,689 2400 feet above sea level, 249 00:12:50,690 --> 00:12:53,483 1000 feet above the ground near Zurich. 250 00:12:54,910 --> 00:12:59,549 Decision height is the minimum height 251 00:12:59,550 --> 00:13:03,309 you can descend before you need to decide 252 00:13:03,310 --> 00:13:05,689 whether you can see the runway 253 00:13:05,690 --> 00:13:08,179 and continue the approach visually, 254 00:13:08,180 --> 00:13:11,189 or you have to make a decision to go around. 255 00:13:11,190 --> 00:13:12,439 I have ground contact. 256 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:13,543 We're continuing on. 257 00:13:17,978 --> 00:13:20,739 500. 258 00:13:20,740 --> 00:13:23,539 Captain Lutz still can't see the runway lights, 259 00:13:23,540 --> 00:13:25,149 but knows that the flight ahead of him 260 00:13:25,150 --> 00:13:26,882 had the same problem. 261 00:13:26,883 --> 00:13:28,179 Damn. 262 00:13:28,180 --> 00:13:30,399 He said he saw the runway 1.3 miles. 263 00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:31,309 They should almost be 264 00:13:31,310 --> 00:13:33,679 on top of the runway by now. 265 00:13:33,680 --> 00:13:36,473 But for some reason they still can't see it. 266 00:13:37,764 --> 00:13:39,492 Make it go around? 267 00:13:39,493 --> 00:13:40,428 Yeah. 268 00:13:40,429 --> 00:13:41,839 Crossair 3597... 269 00:13:41,840 --> 00:13:44,929 The crew decides to abort the landing. 270 00:13:44,930 --> 00:13:47,019 Go around. 271 00:13:47,020 --> 00:13:48,949 And pushes the plane to its limits 272 00:13:48,950 --> 00:13:51,083 in an effort to get it to climb. 273 00:13:54,680 --> 00:13:57,719 Captain Lutz throttles up his plane's four jet engines 274 00:13:57,720 --> 00:14:00,441 as he aborts his landing at Zurich airport. 275 00:14:05,000 --> 00:14:06,569 But it's too late. 276 00:14:06,570 --> 00:14:08,339 There's not enough time for the engines 277 00:14:08,340 --> 00:14:11,729 to get to full power and clear a tree-covered hill 278 00:14:11,730 --> 00:14:13,373 suddenly looming dead ahead. 279 00:14:15,730 --> 00:14:17,349 Residents of a nearby village 280 00:14:17,350 --> 00:14:20,693 witness flight 3597's final moments. 281 00:14:22,810 --> 00:14:24,609 I was walking down with my dog. 282 00:14:24,610 --> 00:14:25,442 All of a sudden, 283 00:14:25,443 --> 00:14:28,199 I saw that aircraft coming from behind 284 00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:29,913 the forest, the little hill. 285 00:14:30,959 --> 00:14:33,809 I thought oh, it's very low, 286 00:14:33,810 --> 00:14:35,519 and it's not on the same route 287 00:14:35,520 --> 00:14:37,519 as the aircraft normally are 288 00:14:37,520 --> 00:14:40,769 coming to land the airport of Zurich. 289 00:14:40,770 --> 00:14:43,342 The jet clips the treetops. 290 00:14:49,320 --> 00:14:52,643 Suddenly, it was shaking very hard. 291 00:14:53,870 --> 00:14:55,793 What's happening, something is wrong. 292 00:15:05,475 --> 00:15:06,549 Moments later, 293 00:15:06,550 --> 00:15:08,804 the aircraft plunges into the hillside. 294 00:15:08,805 --> 00:15:09,638 Damn! 295 00:15:16,965 --> 00:15:18,179 Crossair 3597, 296 00:15:18,180 --> 00:15:19,199 this is Zurich tower. 297 00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:20,032 Do you copy? 298 00:15:20,033 --> 00:15:21,419 Crossair 3597, 299 00:15:21,420 --> 00:15:22,349 this is Zurich tower. 300 00:15:22,350 --> 00:15:23,183 Do you copy? 301 00:15:24,350 --> 00:15:25,559 All of a sudden, 302 00:15:25,560 --> 00:15:28,799 the whole sky in the west was getting really orange, 303 00:15:28,800 --> 00:15:30,173 like a big fire. 304 00:15:31,040 --> 00:15:32,203 Like an explosion. 305 00:15:34,170 --> 00:15:37,069 The impact tears the aircraft apart. 306 00:15:37,070 --> 00:15:38,309 The wings broke off, 307 00:15:38,310 --> 00:15:40,309 and the fuel is in the wings, 308 00:15:40,310 --> 00:15:44,907 so the flames really sort of shot inside the plane. 309 00:15:50,776 --> 00:15:52,039 Flight 3597, 310 00:15:52,040 --> 00:15:53,059 this is Zurich tower. 311 00:15:53,060 --> 00:15:53,923 Do you copy? 312 00:15:57,410 --> 00:15:58,949 This is Zurich tower. 313 00:15:58,950 --> 00:16:01,379 We have a possible emergency in approach sector east. 314 00:16:01,380 --> 00:16:03,693 I repeat, approach sector east. 315 00:16:09,389 --> 00:16:12,209 Crossair flight 3597 has crashed 316 00:16:12,210 --> 00:16:13,779 near the village of Bassersdorf, 317 00:16:13,780 --> 00:16:15,103 northeast of Zurich. 318 00:16:16,820 --> 00:16:19,349 Some people have survived the accident, 319 00:16:19,350 --> 00:16:21,229 including Peter Hogenkamp 320 00:16:21,230 --> 00:16:22,583 and Jacqueline Badran. 321 00:16:26,167 --> 00:16:29,179 I don't have any memory of how we really walked out. 322 00:16:29,180 --> 00:16:32,409 Because the back was cut off, 323 00:16:32,410 --> 00:16:35,509 and we were just able to walk out there. 324 00:16:35,510 --> 00:16:38,289 One member of Passion Fruit also survives. 325 00:16:38,290 --> 00:16:41,649 But her two band mates seated just one row ahead of her 326 00:16:41,650 --> 00:16:42,533 have been killed. 327 00:16:46,440 --> 00:16:49,039 When they give you these instructions 328 00:16:49,040 --> 00:16:51,449 in the beginning when you get on the plane, 329 00:16:51,450 --> 00:16:53,459 how come they never tell you how far 330 00:16:53,460 --> 00:16:55,739 you have to run away from a burning plane. 331 00:16:55,740 --> 00:16:57,506 Because they never tell you. 332 00:16:58,968 --> 00:17:00,009 Let's get away from here. 333 00:17:00,010 --> 00:17:02,523 So we thought, I don't know 100 meters. 334 00:17:06,000 --> 00:17:06,919 Within minutes, 335 00:17:06,920 --> 00:17:09,569 emergency workers get to the crash site. 336 00:17:13,347 --> 00:17:14,400 Hey. 337 00:17:14,401 --> 00:17:15,874 Over here. 338 00:17:15,875 --> 00:17:16,708 Over here! 339 00:17:17,731 --> 00:17:19,148 Over here! 340 00:17:19,149 --> 00:17:21,239 24 of the 33 people 341 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:24,083 on board flight 3597 are dead, 342 00:17:25,530 --> 00:17:27,359 including Captain Lutz 343 00:17:27,360 --> 00:17:29,343 and First Officer Stefan Lohrer. 344 00:17:34,900 --> 00:17:36,069 Daniel Knecht, 345 00:17:36,070 --> 00:17:37,799 an investigator from Switzerland's 346 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:40,159 aircraft investigation bureau, 347 00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:41,483 arrives at the scene. 348 00:17:42,840 --> 00:17:46,759 I got the call from our rescue service 349 00:17:46,760 --> 00:17:48,889 about half past ten in the evening. 350 00:17:48,890 --> 00:17:51,549 Half an hour later, I was on the accident site. 351 00:17:51,550 --> 00:17:54,409 The rear part of the fuselage was quite intact. 352 00:17:54,410 --> 00:17:56,349 It was also the region where 353 00:17:56,350 --> 00:18:00,263 most of the survivors step out without injury. 354 00:18:02,250 --> 00:18:04,649 For Peter Hogenkamp and his partner, 355 00:18:04,650 --> 00:18:07,029 it appears that moving to the rear of the plane 356 00:18:07,030 --> 00:18:08,373 saved their lives. 357 00:18:09,250 --> 00:18:11,069 I think it was just good luck. 358 00:18:11,070 --> 00:18:13,539 I think it would've been a whole different story 359 00:18:13,540 --> 00:18:15,633 if we wouldn't have changed seats. 360 00:18:17,930 --> 00:18:20,663 So the Passion Fruits may have saved our lives. 361 00:18:21,830 --> 00:18:24,539 While rescuers care for the survivors, 362 00:18:24,540 --> 00:18:27,003 Knecht and his team survey the crash site. 363 00:18:29,890 --> 00:18:32,329 The location of the wreckage far from the airport 364 00:18:32,330 --> 00:18:34,293 is of interest to the investigators. 365 00:18:36,450 --> 00:18:39,686 4 kilometers and 50 meters from the runway. 366 00:18:39,687 --> 00:18:43,969 The aircraft was not where it was intended to be. 367 00:18:43,970 --> 00:18:46,889 He collided with a hill east of runway 28, 368 00:18:46,890 --> 00:18:49,403 so obviously he was too low. 369 00:18:50,510 --> 00:18:51,763 The first question was, 370 00:18:52,600 --> 00:18:54,793 why was this aircraft too low? 371 00:18:55,670 --> 00:18:57,369 The black box flight recorders 372 00:18:57,370 --> 00:18:58,693 are found in the wreckage. 373 00:19:00,950 --> 00:19:02,250 They're in good condition. 374 00:19:11,020 --> 00:19:12,829 Investigators are well aware 375 00:19:12,830 --> 00:19:14,989 that this is the worst aviation disaster 376 00:19:14,990 --> 00:19:17,363 on Swiss territory in over a decade. 377 00:19:20,180 --> 00:19:22,653 They're under pressure to find answers fast. 378 00:19:25,920 --> 00:19:27,759 While work continues at the crash, 379 00:19:27,760 --> 00:19:30,053 a command post is established nearby. 380 00:19:34,450 --> 00:19:37,619 Jean Overney heads the Swiss investigation bureau. 381 00:19:37,620 --> 00:19:39,963 He takes charge of the Crossair file. 382 00:19:42,083 --> 00:19:45,199 The public was very anxious about this crash. 383 00:19:45,200 --> 00:19:47,299 The media were raising many questions, 384 00:19:47,300 --> 00:19:50,533 so we naturally had to open a more in-depth investigation. 385 00:19:52,760 --> 00:19:54,299 The accident happened at the end 386 00:19:54,300 --> 00:19:56,429 of a long day for Captain Lutz. 387 00:19:56,430 --> 00:19:57,809 But given his background, 388 00:19:57,810 --> 00:20:00,513 investigators must consider other causes. 389 00:20:01,480 --> 00:20:04,029 We knew that the captain was very experienced. 390 00:20:04,030 --> 00:20:09,030 He had about 17,000 flight hours during his whole career. 391 00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:11,539 Flight instructor, flight examiner. 392 00:20:11,540 --> 00:20:14,533 Within the company for more than 20 years. 393 00:20:15,630 --> 00:20:16,759 The flight recorders 394 00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:19,653 are sent to a lab in Paris to extract their data. 395 00:20:21,820 --> 00:20:22,719 At the same time, 396 00:20:22,720 --> 00:20:24,989 investigators have begun retrieving fragments 397 00:20:24,990 --> 00:20:26,623 of wreckage from the crash site. 398 00:20:28,440 --> 00:20:30,833 They look for tell-tale signs of trouble. 399 00:20:31,690 --> 00:20:34,269 The position of switches is very important. 400 00:20:34,270 --> 00:20:36,569 Also, if you have some indication panels, 401 00:20:36,570 --> 00:20:38,333 for example, with bulbs in it, 402 00:20:39,590 --> 00:20:42,279 after a crash you can analyze 403 00:20:42,280 --> 00:20:44,819 the different wires in the bulbs 404 00:20:44,820 --> 00:20:49,820 and then you can determine which indications 405 00:20:50,190 --> 00:20:54,053 or even warnings were active at the moment of the impact. 406 00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:00,829 An investigator comes across 407 00:21:00,830 --> 00:21:02,989 an intriguing piece of wreckage. 408 00:21:02,990 --> 00:21:05,719 Oil gauges provide information about the oil 409 00:21:05,720 --> 00:21:08,453 flowing to the plane's four turbo fan engines. 410 00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:13,563 Curiously, one of them is installed upside down. 411 00:21:17,010 --> 00:21:19,089 This raised a lot of questions for us 412 00:21:19,090 --> 00:21:20,389 and for the media. 413 00:21:20,390 --> 00:21:22,849 Everyone wanted to know how you could fly a plane 414 00:21:22,850 --> 00:21:25,233 with an instrument installed upside down. 415 00:21:27,230 --> 00:21:29,339 It wasn't a very important instrument. 416 00:21:29,340 --> 00:21:30,529 You could still read it, 417 00:21:30,530 --> 00:21:32,653 even if it was installed upside down. 418 00:21:34,550 --> 00:21:37,449 But if this obvious problem was never fixed, 419 00:21:37,450 --> 00:21:39,450 what else could be wrong with the plane? 420 00:21:42,180 --> 00:21:43,012 Obviously, 421 00:21:43,013 --> 00:21:44,740 there were maintenance issues here. 422 00:21:45,650 --> 00:21:46,849 We looked at how the company 423 00:21:46,850 --> 00:21:48,850 was doing the maintenance of the planes. 424 00:21:53,830 --> 00:21:55,939 While this review is being launched, 425 00:21:55,940 --> 00:21:58,139 investigators study the plane's engines 426 00:21:58,140 --> 00:21:59,579 to determine if they were running 427 00:21:59,580 --> 00:22:00,883 at the time of the crash. 428 00:22:04,220 --> 00:22:06,769 Soil, tree branches, and other debris 429 00:22:06,770 --> 00:22:09,473 lodged inside the engines suggest they were. 430 00:22:11,130 --> 00:22:13,209 We checked them out visually, 431 00:22:13,210 --> 00:22:16,339 and we saw that the four engines were turning 432 00:22:16,340 --> 00:22:17,840 in the moment of the accident. 433 00:22:19,120 --> 00:22:21,099 Authorities need to be sure. 434 00:22:21,100 --> 00:22:22,739 They will have to check their findings 435 00:22:22,740 --> 00:22:24,853 against data from the flight recorders. 436 00:22:28,110 --> 00:22:28,942 In the meantime, 437 00:22:28,943 --> 00:22:31,389 the location of the crash suggests something 438 00:22:31,390 --> 00:22:33,229 may have tragically mislead the crew 439 00:22:33,230 --> 00:22:35,959 on their descent towards Zurich airport. 440 00:22:35,960 --> 00:22:37,589 Knecht focuses on the flight charts 441 00:22:37,590 --> 00:22:39,393 they used to plan their approach. 442 00:22:40,980 --> 00:22:42,299 Is the problem with the approach 443 00:22:42,300 --> 00:22:44,309 or is the problem with the aircraft? 444 00:22:44,310 --> 00:22:47,315 This kind of question was dominant 445 00:22:47,316 --> 00:22:49,613 when we started the investigation. 446 00:22:51,240 --> 00:22:53,619 Are you familiar with the 28 approach? 447 00:22:53,620 --> 00:22:55,109 Yes, I've done it a couple of times. 448 00:22:55,110 --> 00:22:57,029 The approach chart provides pilots 449 00:22:57,030 --> 00:22:58,709 with directions to the runway. 450 00:22:58,710 --> 00:23:00,379 Trasadingen Zurich. 451 00:23:00,380 --> 00:23:02,619 Details about radio frequencies 452 00:23:02,620 --> 00:23:04,469 as well as altitudes and speed 453 00:23:04,470 --> 00:23:06,170 for various stages of the landing. 454 00:23:07,910 --> 00:23:10,139 When investigators study an approach chart 455 00:23:10,140 --> 00:23:12,179 like the one the crew used, 456 00:23:12,180 --> 00:23:14,489 they make a shocking discovery. 457 00:23:14,490 --> 00:23:17,663 The chart does not show the hill that the plane hit. 458 00:23:18,930 --> 00:23:21,259 An approach chart is a very important thing 459 00:23:21,260 --> 00:23:23,679 because an indication which is not correct 460 00:23:23,680 --> 00:23:27,159 on this approach chart could mislead a crew, 461 00:23:27,160 --> 00:23:31,339 and so easily make them do something wrong. 462 00:23:31,340 --> 00:23:35,063 So, tell me about the runway and the conditions. 463 00:23:36,404 --> 00:23:38,789 Overcast with light snowfall. 464 00:23:38,790 --> 00:23:40,499 A faulty chart would certainly 465 00:23:40,500 --> 00:23:42,839 have been a danger to a crew unfamiliar 466 00:23:42,840 --> 00:23:44,469 with Zurich airport. 467 00:23:44,470 --> 00:23:47,763 But Lutz had flown in and out of Zurich countless times. 468 00:23:48,970 --> 00:23:51,883 He and his first officer were both based in the city. 469 00:23:53,100 --> 00:23:57,149 The commander was flying out of Zurich, 470 00:23:57,150 --> 00:24:00,829 I think for the last 15 to 20 years, 471 00:24:00,830 --> 00:24:03,163 so he was really used to this airport. 472 00:24:04,860 --> 00:24:06,249 Investigators conclude 473 00:24:06,250 --> 00:24:08,479 that the approach chart, while faulty, 474 00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:10,299 could have tripped up some crews, 475 00:24:10,300 --> 00:24:11,413 but not this one. 476 00:24:16,770 --> 00:24:19,353 Some definitive news finally arrives. 477 00:24:20,870 --> 00:24:22,779 The engine data from the black box 478 00:24:22,780 --> 00:24:25,233 confirms the observations at the crash site. 479 00:24:26,260 --> 00:24:28,606 We could see quite easily that the engines 480 00:24:28,607 --> 00:24:30,833 worked absolutely normally. 481 00:24:31,750 --> 00:24:33,129 Another potential cause 482 00:24:33,130 --> 00:24:35,829 of the accident is eliminated from the list. 483 00:24:35,830 --> 00:24:37,063 Mechanical failure. 484 00:24:39,060 --> 00:24:42,143 Investigators now consider a different possibility. 485 00:24:43,260 --> 00:24:44,909 I was covering the approach west position 486 00:24:44,910 --> 00:24:46,009 on the night of the accident. 487 00:24:46,010 --> 00:24:47,619 Could air traffic control 488 00:24:47,620 --> 00:24:49,623 have somehow mishandled the plane? 489 00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:52,349 Investigators study records 490 00:24:52,350 --> 00:24:54,069 from the night of the accident, 491 00:24:54,070 --> 00:24:56,183 and make a disconcerting find. 492 00:24:57,020 --> 00:24:58,779 Zurich airport's control tower 493 00:24:58,780 --> 00:25:01,193 was understaffed at the time of the accident. 494 00:25:02,367 --> 00:25:04,149 He left before his shift ended. 495 00:25:04,150 --> 00:25:05,669 The supervisor in the tower 496 00:25:05,670 --> 00:25:06,949 went home early, 497 00:25:06,950 --> 00:25:10,359 leaving a lone controller to guide flight 3597 498 00:25:10,360 --> 00:25:11,423 in for its landing. 499 00:25:13,860 --> 00:25:15,599 She was relatively young, 500 00:25:15,600 --> 00:25:18,203 and let's say she didn't have that much experience. 501 00:25:19,950 --> 00:25:22,149 Investigators now study transcripts 502 00:25:22,150 --> 00:25:25,009 of conversations between that air traffic controller 503 00:25:25,010 --> 00:25:26,109 and the flight crew, 504 00:25:26,110 --> 00:25:28,313 looking for signs she made a mistake. 505 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:31,623 Crossair 3597, you're identified. 506 00:25:33,286 --> 00:25:35,779 Speed 180 or less. 507 00:25:35,780 --> 00:25:38,829 - Crossair 3597 - Zurich approach 508 00:25:38,830 --> 00:25:40,149 Crossair 3597. 509 00:25:40,150 --> 00:25:40,982 Clear to land. 510 00:25:40,983 --> 00:25:42,159 They find no indication 511 00:25:42,160 --> 00:25:45,149 the controller gave the crew faulty instructions. 512 00:25:45,150 --> 00:25:47,189 But they do come across the radio call 513 00:25:47,190 --> 00:25:48,969 by the pilot of the Crossair flight 514 00:25:48,970 --> 00:25:50,229 that landed minutes earlier. 515 00:25:50,230 --> 00:25:53,819 Zurich tower this is Crossair 3891. 516 00:25:53,820 --> 00:25:56,239 Visibility approaching 28 was borderline. 517 00:25:56,240 --> 00:25:59,759 We could only see the runway from 1.3 miles out. 518 00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:01,699 That pilot warned of poor conditions 519 00:26:01,700 --> 00:26:03,699 on the approach to runway 28. 520 00:26:03,700 --> 00:26:05,589 She had options. 521 00:26:05,590 --> 00:26:07,039 They wonder why the controller 522 00:26:07,040 --> 00:26:09,199 didn't shut the runway down. 523 00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:10,579 Because of poor visibility, 524 00:26:10,580 --> 00:26:12,769 she could've reopened runway 14 525 00:26:12,770 --> 00:26:14,543 in spite of the noise by law. 526 00:26:15,430 --> 00:26:16,739 This would've allowed the crews 527 00:26:16,740 --> 00:26:18,343 to make an instrument approach. 528 00:26:19,510 --> 00:26:20,719 But she didn't do that. 529 00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:23,289 Thank you, Crossair 3891. 530 00:26:23,290 --> 00:26:25,032 Have a good evening. 531 00:26:25,033 --> 00:26:27,329 It would have been much easier to fly ILS approach 532 00:26:27,330 --> 00:26:28,599 in this kind of weather, 533 00:26:28,600 --> 00:26:32,259 regardless of this political issue. 534 00:26:32,260 --> 00:26:33,259 It's suspected that 535 00:26:33,260 --> 00:26:34,989 without her supervisor present, 536 00:26:34,990 --> 00:26:36,869 the controller lacked the experience 537 00:26:36,870 --> 00:26:38,633 to make such an important call. 538 00:26:41,610 --> 00:26:43,489 So it's clear that to make the decision 539 00:26:43,490 --> 00:26:45,869 not to allow an approach on runway 28, 540 00:26:45,870 --> 00:26:48,029 and instead make it on runway 14 541 00:26:48,030 --> 00:26:50,369 demanded a certain kind of confidence, 542 00:26:50,370 --> 00:26:51,883 a certain kind of courage. 543 00:26:54,530 --> 00:26:56,849 However, Captain Lutz also heard 544 00:26:56,850 --> 00:26:58,024 the same warning. 545 00:26:58,025 --> 00:26:59,282 28 was borderline. 546 00:26:59,283 --> 00:27:02,759 We could only see the runway from 1.3 miles out. 547 00:27:02,760 --> 00:27:03,759 Gear down. 548 00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:05,860 He kept going in spite of it. 549 00:27:07,660 --> 00:27:09,279 Investigators are now certain 550 00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:12,023 that the controller was in no way responsible. 551 00:27:14,370 --> 00:27:16,729 The pilot can always say no. 552 00:27:16,730 --> 00:27:19,839 He can always recheck the clearance. 553 00:27:19,840 --> 00:27:23,579 If he thinks that landing is probably not possible, 554 00:27:23,580 --> 00:27:26,099 he's free to retract an approach clearance, 555 00:27:26,100 --> 00:27:28,289 and ask for a different one. 556 00:27:28,290 --> 00:27:30,279 Jean Overney can't understand 557 00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:33,239 why Captain Lutz didn't do exactly that. 558 00:27:33,240 --> 00:27:35,309 He should've known that he didn't have to make 559 00:27:35,310 --> 00:27:37,473 a non precision approach in bad weather. 560 00:27:41,670 --> 00:27:44,039 When we saw the mistake the pilot had made, 561 00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:45,839 we immediately asked ourselves, 562 00:27:45,840 --> 00:27:47,453 well, how is it possible? 563 00:27:49,370 --> 00:27:51,939 Because for an experienced pilot who was an instructor, 564 00:27:51,940 --> 00:27:53,943 this was a really basic mistake. 565 00:27:57,300 --> 00:27:59,029 Overney is beginning to wonder 566 00:27:59,030 --> 00:28:01,199 if something in Lutz's long career 567 00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:03,769 is hiding clues about his behavior 568 00:28:03,770 --> 00:28:05,220 on the night of the accident. 569 00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:10,499 One by one, 570 00:28:10,500 --> 00:28:13,209 investigators are ruling out the possible causes 571 00:28:13,210 --> 00:28:16,243 of the crash of Crossair flight 3597. 572 00:28:20,800 --> 00:28:23,689 They hope the answer lies in the cockpit voice recorder, 573 00:28:23,690 --> 00:28:25,973 or CVR, of the doomed jet. 574 00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:29,489 After waiting many days for its data 575 00:28:29,490 --> 00:28:31,143 to be sent back from France, 576 00:28:32,260 --> 00:28:34,439 they now paw over it carefully, 577 00:28:34,440 --> 00:28:36,929 listening for any clues that might explain 578 00:28:36,930 --> 00:28:39,629 why the plane was flying so close to the ground 579 00:28:39,630 --> 00:28:41,323 so far from the airport. 580 00:28:43,150 --> 00:28:45,089 L nav is engaged. 581 00:28:45,090 --> 00:28:47,889 Authorities get more than they expected. 582 00:28:47,890 --> 00:28:50,499 Not only is the CVR complete, 583 00:28:50,500 --> 00:28:52,619 but Captain Lutz offers a running commentary 584 00:28:52,620 --> 00:28:54,329 on everything he does. 585 00:28:54,330 --> 00:28:56,587 And on inbound track 275. 586 00:28:59,260 --> 00:29:02,459 Speed is checked, flaps 18. 587 00:29:02,460 --> 00:29:03,949 It's practically a road map 588 00:29:03,950 --> 00:29:06,353 to understanding what went on in the cockpit. 589 00:29:08,820 --> 00:29:12,339 That's not usual that the pilot flying 590 00:29:12,340 --> 00:29:15,789 is talking so much about what he is doing 591 00:29:15,790 --> 00:29:17,053 or what he is seeing. 592 00:29:18,120 --> 00:29:20,120 For the investigation this helped a lot. 593 00:29:21,320 --> 00:29:22,789 100 above. 594 00:29:22,790 --> 00:29:24,729 Do we have ground contact? 595 00:29:24,730 --> 00:29:25,562 Yes. 596 00:29:25,563 --> 00:29:26,529 Investigators learn 597 00:29:26,530 --> 00:29:28,789 that the crew of flight 3597 598 00:29:28,790 --> 00:29:30,409 was looking for the runway, 599 00:29:30,410 --> 00:29:33,249 and believed it would soon come into view. 600 00:29:33,250 --> 00:29:34,649 From the CVR, 601 00:29:34,650 --> 00:29:39,650 we saw that the commander and also his co-pilot 602 00:29:39,800 --> 00:29:42,979 were not feeling some fear or feeling 603 00:29:42,980 --> 00:29:47,159 that something was not going as they planned. 604 00:29:47,160 --> 00:29:48,479 But what they didn't know, 605 00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:49,889 was that the plane was actually 606 00:29:49,890 --> 00:29:51,913 four miles shy of its target. 607 00:29:53,640 --> 00:29:54,472 Damn. 608 00:29:54,473 --> 00:29:57,379 He said he saw the runway 1.3 miles. 609 00:29:57,380 --> 00:29:58,269 300. 610 00:29:58,270 --> 00:30:00,199 Captain Lutz obviously thought his jet 611 00:30:00,200 --> 00:30:02,117 was closer to the runway than it was. 612 00:30:03,780 --> 00:30:05,959 Investigators consider the possibility 613 00:30:05,960 --> 00:30:08,879 he was mislead by his distance measuring equipment, 614 00:30:08,880 --> 00:30:09,713 or DME. 615 00:30:11,550 --> 00:30:13,799 It's supposed to tell pilots how far they are 616 00:30:13,800 --> 00:30:14,650 from the airport. 617 00:30:16,150 --> 00:30:20,059 The DME indication would have given this distance, 618 00:30:20,060 --> 00:30:23,460 and then he would have detected immediately 619 00:30:24,950 --> 00:30:27,000 that he was below the approach (mumbles). 620 00:30:28,210 --> 00:30:31,763 Perhaps the DME from flight 3597 was faulty. 621 00:30:33,270 --> 00:30:35,109 It's been recovered from the wreckage, 622 00:30:35,110 --> 00:30:37,279 but it's impossible to tell what information 623 00:30:37,280 --> 00:30:38,533 it gave the pilots. 624 00:30:40,620 --> 00:30:42,709 However, there is another way to check 625 00:30:42,710 --> 00:30:45,010 whether the instrument was functioning or not. 626 00:30:46,460 --> 00:30:49,629 The DME distance is not recorded on the FDR. 627 00:30:49,630 --> 00:30:51,879 But on two occasions, 628 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:54,263 the pilots mentioned the distance. 629 00:30:55,520 --> 00:30:57,439 Six miles is checked. 630 00:30:57,440 --> 00:30:58,669 Yes. 631 00:30:58,670 --> 00:31:01,149 But was Captain Lutz really six miles out 632 00:31:01,150 --> 00:31:03,213 from the runway when he made that report? 633 00:31:04,770 --> 00:31:07,759 Investigators compare the time Lutz checked his DME 634 00:31:07,760 --> 00:31:10,239 with radar data on the aircraft's location 635 00:31:10,240 --> 00:31:11,823 at that exact same time. 636 00:31:13,210 --> 00:31:15,089 They can see that when Lutz's instruments 637 00:31:15,090 --> 00:31:17,013 were telling him he was six miles out, 638 00:31:18,870 --> 00:31:20,763 that's precisely where he was. 639 00:31:22,350 --> 00:31:25,529 We knew that the pilots had an indication 640 00:31:25,530 --> 00:31:27,763 for the distance available at that time. 641 00:31:28,860 --> 00:31:30,019 An instrument problem 642 00:31:30,020 --> 00:31:31,499 can now be crossed off the list 643 00:31:31,500 --> 00:31:33,033 as a factor in the crash, 644 00:31:34,940 --> 00:31:37,579 which only heightens the mystery. 645 00:31:37,580 --> 00:31:38,839 I have ground contact. 646 00:31:38,840 --> 00:31:40,309 We're continuing on. 647 00:31:40,310 --> 00:31:42,529 If the instrument was working, 648 00:31:42,530 --> 00:31:44,879 why did Lutz think he was closer to the runway 649 00:31:44,880 --> 00:31:45,983 than he actually was? 650 00:31:47,910 --> 00:31:50,059 The answer lies not in what investigators 651 00:31:50,060 --> 00:31:52,439 hear on the cockpit voice recorder, 652 00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:53,773 but what they don't hear. 653 00:31:54,992 --> 00:31:56,942 I don't see anything after six miles. 654 00:31:58,620 --> 00:32:00,019 Do we have ground contact? 655 00:32:00,020 --> 00:32:02,549 Neither pilot read out a DME check 656 00:32:02,550 --> 00:32:04,939 after the six mile reading. 657 00:32:04,940 --> 00:32:05,772 Yes. 658 00:32:05,773 --> 00:32:06,879 It tells investigators 659 00:32:06,880 --> 00:32:09,579 that Lutz wasn't monitoring his vital instrument 660 00:32:09,580 --> 00:32:11,713 during the final minutes of his approach. 661 00:32:13,430 --> 00:32:15,499 Instead, he was preoccupied with spotting 662 00:32:15,500 --> 00:32:16,773 the lights of the runway. 663 00:32:18,020 --> 00:32:20,303 That's not what pilots are supposed to do. 664 00:32:23,660 --> 00:32:24,579 The pilot flying 665 00:32:24,580 --> 00:32:26,779 is supposed to keep his eyes on the instruments, 666 00:32:26,780 --> 00:32:29,309 because all the information he needs is there. 667 00:32:29,310 --> 00:32:31,499 He only switches to flying by sight 668 00:32:31,500 --> 00:32:33,393 when the non-flying pilot says, 669 00:32:35,410 --> 00:32:37,169 runway in sight. 670 00:32:37,170 --> 00:32:39,139 Only then can the captain take his eyes 671 00:32:39,140 --> 00:32:41,619 off the instruments and fly by sight. 672 00:32:41,620 --> 00:32:43,773 Because the landing is performed visually. 673 00:32:50,500 --> 00:32:52,559 If Lutz had checked his instruments, 674 00:32:52,560 --> 00:32:54,659 he would've known how far from the runway 675 00:32:54,660 --> 00:32:55,923 he actually was. 676 00:32:56,950 --> 00:32:59,743 But how had he ended up such a long distance from it? 677 00:33:01,030 --> 00:33:02,223 Confirm three greens. 678 00:33:03,740 --> 00:33:05,173 Is checked. 679 00:33:06,340 --> 00:33:08,453 116 knots. 680 00:33:09,330 --> 00:33:11,439 Further analysis of the black box data 681 00:33:11,440 --> 00:33:14,499 reveals that Lutz put his plane into a steep descent 682 00:33:14,500 --> 00:33:18,943 as it began its final approach to Zurich airport. 683 00:33:19,840 --> 00:33:22,669 But it's readily apparent his approach profile 684 00:33:22,670 --> 00:33:24,469 was out of sync with the trajectory 685 00:33:24,470 --> 00:33:25,793 laid out in his chart. 686 00:33:29,430 --> 00:33:31,719 The approach profile for runway 28 687 00:33:31,720 --> 00:33:35,279 calls for pilots to make a gradual and steady descent, 688 00:33:35,280 --> 00:33:37,439 which would bring them to 2400 feet 689 00:33:37,440 --> 00:33:39,883 after they've cleared the hills around Zurich. 690 00:33:41,300 --> 00:33:42,869 Then pilots have to level off 691 00:33:42,870 --> 00:33:44,363 until the spot the runway. 692 00:33:47,630 --> 00:33:49,579 When investigators compare the approach 693 00:33:49,580 --> 00:33:51,409 Lutz made with the approach profile 694 00:33:51,410 --> 00:33:52,773 he was supposed to follow, 695 00:33:54,120 --> 00:33:56,259 they find that his overly steep descent 696 00:33:56,260 --> 00:33:58,839 brought him to 2400 feet 697 00:33:58,840 --> 00:34:01,063 well before he cleared the hills. 698 00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:04,379 Then he continued to descend 699 00:34:04,380 --> 00:34:05,783 until he hit the ground. 700 00:34:09,540 --> 00:34:11,469 It's beginning to look like Lutz 701 00:34:11,470 --> 00:34:14,603 had violated one of the cardinal rules of flying. 702 00:34:17,800 --> 00:34:20,419 Aircraft making non precision approaches 703 00:34:20,420 --> 00:34:22,099 are supposed to level off 704 00:34:22,100 --> 00:34:24,849 at minimum descent altitude, or safe height, 705 00:34:24,850 --> 00:34:26,883 until they have the runway in view. 706 00:34:28,370 --> 00:34:31,039 This safe height is intended to keep the aircraft 707 00:34:31,040 --> 00:34:32,893 above any potential hazards. 708 00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:39,450 It's really a basic error. 709 00:34:40,360 --> 00:34:44,453 Every pilot is trained to respect such minimums. 710 00:34:45,316 --> 00:34:48,319 Not only with VORDME approaches, 711 00:34:48,320 --> 00:34:50,739 but also with ILS approaches. 712 00:34:50,740 --> 00:34:52,819 But Captain Lutz kept his aircraft 713 00:34:52,820 --> 00:34:55,019 in a steep descent without even pausing 714 00:34:55,020 --> 00:34:56,523 at 2400 feet. 715 00:34:57,440 --> 00:35:00,069 The logical next question for investigators, 716 00:35:00,070 --> 00:35:02,919 could he see the runway or not? 717 00:35:02,920 --> 00:35:04,529 I have ground contact. 718 00:35:04,530 --> 00:35:05,919 We're continuing on. 719 00:35:05,920 --> 00:35:08,777 What does he mean by ground contact? 720 00:35:10,350 --> 00:35:12,419 They need to know if it was even possible 721 00:35:12,420 --> 00:35:15,623 for Lutz to see the runway when he reported ground contact. 722 00:35:19,330 --> 00:35:21,369 They retrace his steps in a simulator 723 00:35:21,370 --> 00:35:24,153 programmed with the weather he was facing that night. 724 00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:27,839 Six miles from runway. 725 00:35:27,840 --> 00:35:29,973 Altitude 3300 feet. 726 00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:34,499 4.8 miles. 727 00:35:34,500 --> 00:35:36,509 2400 feet. 728 00:35:36,510 --> 00:35:38,293 Still no runway in sight. 729 00:35:41,720 --> 00:35:43,439 No, he couldn't see the runway 730 00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:46,029 because there was a hill between him and the runway. 731 00:35:46,030 --> 00:35:47,269 And at that altitude, 732 00:35:47,270 --> 00:35:48,820 there's no way he could see it. 733 00:35:51,070 --> 00:35:52,259 The conclusion, 734 00:35:52,260 --> 00:35:54,509 Captain Lutz had clearly violated 735 00:35:54,510 --> 00:35:56,233 his minimum descent altitude. 736 00:35:57,230 --> 00:36:00,049 Whether there is flat terrain or hills, 737 00:36:00,050 --> 00:36:03,569 minimums are set accordingly, 738 00:36:03,570 --> 00:36:06,079 and in no way you can just bust the minimums 739 00:36:06,080 --> 00:36:08,159 whether there's hills or not. 740 00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:09,989 This discovery raises questions 741 00:36:09,990 --> 00:36:12,159 not just about Lutz's actions, 742 00:36:12,160 --> 00:36:14,283 but his young first officer's as well. 743 00:36:15,240 --> 00:36:16,403 Two four the minimum. 744 00:36:17,260 --> 00:36:18,093 Two four. 745 00:36:19,510 --> 00:36:20,673 We're continuing on. 746 00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:24,009 A first officer should not let his captain 747 00:36:24,010 --> 00:36:26,023 breach minimum descent altitudes. 748 00:36:29,460 --> 00:36:31,899 The co-pilot could've said no, stop, 749 00:36:31,900 --> 00:36:33,099 we can't see the runway. 750 00:36:33,100 --> 00:36:34,283 We're not descending. 751 00:36:36,441 --> 00:36:38,519 He considered his captain 752 00:36:38,520 --> 00:36:42,009 an old pilot with a lot of experience. 753 00:36:42,010 --> 00:36:44,323 Not making any mistakes. 754 00:36:44,324 --> 00:36:46,613 He was trusting him to much. 755 00:36:48,570 --> 00:36:52,139 Also by being submissive. 756 00:36:52,140 --> 00:36:54,729 Maybe he won't speak up on time 757 00:36:54,730 --> 00:36:57,193 just to keep harmony in the cockpit. 758 00:36:58,390 --> 00:37:00,189 There were no mechanical failures 759 00:37:00,190 --> 00:37:02,133 or instrument problems with the plane, 760 00:37:04,560 --> 00:37:07,743 nor was the air traffic controller negligent in any way. 761 00:37:09,300 --> 00:37:11,479 But it is now clear that Captan Lutz 762 00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:14,509 made a series of catastrophic piloting errors 763 00:37:14,510 --> 00:37:17,049 that doomed flight 3597 764 00:37:17,050 --> 00:37:19,653 and claimed the lives of 24 people. 765 00:37:22,740 --> 00:37:24,479 Investigators dig deeper 766 00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:27,399 into Captain Hans Ulrich Lutz'z flying record 767 00:37:27,400 --> 00:37:29,549 to see if there's anything in his long background 768 00:37:29,550 --> 00:37:33,083 that could explain why he crashed flight 3597. 769 00:37:35,190 --> 00:37:37,593 What they discover is truly alarming. 770 00:37:38,710 --> 00:37:42,279 Lutz applied to flight school when he was 17 years old. 771 00:37:42,280 --> 00:37:44,049 He was rejected three times 772 00:37:44,050 --> 00:37:45,763 because of his lack of education. 773 00:37:46,700 --> 00:37:49,393 He finally got his license at the age of 20. 774 00:37:50,340 --> 00:37:53,349 But continually failed exams to upgrade 775 00:37:53,350 --> 00:37:56,563 due to his inadequate comprehension of navigation systems. 776 00:37:57,490 --> 00:37:59,999 Captain Lutz may have had a long career, 777 00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:02,329 but it was not a stellar one. 778 00:38:02,330 --> 00:38:05,500 Years of flying and flying hours 779 00:38:06,520 --> 00:38:10,189 don't say anything about competence. 780 00:38:10,190 --> 00:38:11,759 For some reason though, 781 00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:14,339 his record as a below average pilot 782 00:38:14,340 --> 00:38:18,569 didn't prevent Crossair from hiring him in 1979. 783 00:38:18,570 --> 00:38:22,113 There was a red line through his career 784 00:38:22,114 --> 00:38:25,569 where several incidents happened before 785 00:38:25,570 --> 00:38:28,943 and he had missed several checks. 786 00:38:31,970 --> 00:38:33,563 He had some limits. 787 00:38:35,160 --> 00:38:36,719 What's hard to understand for me 788 00:38:36,720 --> 00:38:39,239 is that they were identified 789 00:38:39,240 --> 00:38:43,173 and the decision was made to keep him flying. 790 00:38:45,200 --> 00:38:46,989 Captain Lutz's limited abilities 791 00:38:46,990 --> 00:38:48,733 continued in his new job. 792 00:38:51,380 --> 00:38:53,129 While commanding a sight seeing tour 793 00:38:53,130 --> 00:38:54,319 of the Swiss Alps, 794 00:38:54,320 --> 00:38:55,939 he made a navigation error, 795 00:38:55,940 --> 00:38:57,223 and ended up in Italy. 796 00:38:58,900 --> 00:39:00,579 He only realized his mistake 797 00:39:00,580 --> 00:39:03,433 when his passengers spotted road signs in Italian. 798 00:39:07,150 --> 00:39:08,149 In another incident, 799 00:39:08,150 --> 00:39:11,289 he wrecked a 1.5 million dollar aircraft 800 00:39:11,290 --> 00:39:13,879 after inadvertently retracting the landing gear 801 00:39:13,880 --> 00:39:16,063 while the plane was still one the tarmac. 802 00:39:19,875 --> 00:39:21,709 Lutz's failures forced Crossair 803 00:39:21,710 --> 00:39:23,799 to fire him as in instructor. 804 00:39:23,800 --> 00:39:26,853 But they allowed him to continue flying passenger planes. 805 00:39:28,950 --> 00:39:32,049 I personally do pilot assessments. 806 00:39:32,050 --> 00:39:35,099 And he would never have gone through my assessment 807 00:39:35,100 --> 00:39:37,023 with a positive recommendation. 808 00:39:38,750 --> 00:39:40,009 Okay. 809 00:39:40,010 --> 00:39:42,209 Approach course 1, 3... 810 00:39:42,210 --> 00:39:44,349 Investigators wonder why Crossair 811 00:39:44,350 --> 00:39:46,319 allowed Lutz to stay on as a pilot 812 00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:48,133 if he was not entirely competent. 813 00:39:49,030 --> 00:39:52,373 The answer appears to be they may have had little choice. 814 00:40:01,110 --> 00:40:02,649 Investigators' first glimpse 815 00:40:02,650 --> 00:40:04,339 into the problems at Crossair 816 00:40:04,340 --> 00:40:06,719 came after they found the upside down gauge 817 00:40:06,720 --> 00:40:07,693 at the crash site. 818 00:40:10,200 --> 00:40:11,659 We had to check if the employees 819 00:40:11,660 --> 00:40:13,519 had received the proper training, 820 00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:15,529 if they had the qualifications required 821 00:40:15,530 --> 00:40:16,733 for this kind of work. 822 00:40:18,660 --> 00:40:21,399 No glaring maintenance issues were found. 823 00:40:21,400 --> 00:40:23,869 But a closer look at Crossair's hiring practices 824 00:40:23,870 --> 00:40:27,059 explains why Captain Lutz was allowed to keep flying. 825 00:40:27,060 --> 00:40:29,259 The airline may have grown too fast 826 00:40:29,260 --> 00:40:31,690 throughout the 80s and 90s. 827 00:40:35,370 --> 00:40:37,649 The company expanded very rapidly, 828 00:40:37,650 --> 00:40:38,729 and with that success, 829 00:40:38,730 --> 00:40:41,480 it's clear that you have to quickly increase the staff. 830 00:40:42,420 --> 00:40:44,139 Office workers, mechanics, 831 00:40:44,140 --> 00:40:45,049 that's one thing. 832 00:40:45,050 --> 00:40:47,683 But pilots, you have to go out and find them. 833 00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:51,879 In those days, 834 00:40:51,880 --> 00:40:54,129 they were desperate for pilots. 835 00:40:54,130 --> 00:40:57,919 And somehow no decision was made to lay him off 836 00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:00,559 because of his questionable performance 837 00:41:00,560 --> 00:41:01,653 during his career. 838 00:41:02,770 --> 00:41:04,089 Captain Lutz's failings 839 00:41:04,090 --> 00:41:08,219 caught up with him on November the 24th 2001. 840 00:41:08,220 --> 00:41:10,579 Make it go around? 841 00:41:10,580 --> 00:41:11,413 Go around. 842 00:41:14,830 --> 00:41:17,363 24 people paid with their lives. 843 00:41:29,123 --> 00:41:30,939 After the accident report was issued, 844 00:41:30,940 --> 00:41:33,489 sweeping changes were made. 845 00:41:33,490 --> 00:41:35,839 Swiss aviation authorities had Crossair 846 00:41:35,840 --> 00:41:39,529 increase the number of employees overseeing pilots. 847 00:41:39,530 --> 00:41:41,679 They also scrutinized other airlines 848 00:41:41,680 --> 00:41:43,029 to determine if there were other 849 00:41:43,030 --> 00:41:45,203 substandard performers like Lutz. 850 00:41:52,547 --> 00:41:54,189 One thing is for sure, 851 00:41:54,190 --> 00:41:58,453 that selection process has improved considerably. 852 00:41:59,860 --> 00:42:03,739 Of course, awareness of people's performance 853 00:42:03,740 --> 00:42:06,573 during their career was increased considerably. 854 00:42:08,530 --> 00:42:11,939 Crossair went out of existence in 2002. 855 00:42:11,940 --> 00:42:14,473 It was folded into the Swiss National Carrier. 856 00:42:17,300 --> 00:42:19,979 Once Crossair became Swiss, 857 00:42:19,980 --> 00:42:24,980 they adopted the previous Swiss Air selection process. 858 00:42:27,230 --> 00:42:30,019 And I can say today, 859 00:42:30,020 --> 00:42:32,599 which is already nine years since, 860 00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:35,669 that safety has improved considerably, 861 00:42:35,670 --> 00:42:38,959 and also quality of the pilots 862 00:42:38,960 --> 00:42:42,213 that are hired by companies like Swiss. 863 00:42:48,130 --> 00:42:51,239 Since the crash of flight 3597, 864 00:42:51,240 --> 00:42:53,759 Zurich's runway 28 has been upgraded 865 00:42:53,760 --> 00:42:55,699 with both an instrument landing system 866 00:42:55,700 --> 00:42:58,239 and an automatic warning that alerts controllers 867 00:42:58,240 --> 00:43:00,083 when a plane's approach is too low. 868 00:43:01,200 --> 00:43:02,999 There has never been another accident 869 00:43:03,000 --> 00:43:04,413 involving that runway. 870 00:43:05,901 --> 00:43:07,349 But the Crossair tragedy, 871 00:43:07,350 --> 00:43:09,529 and the circumstances that spawned it 872 00:43:09,530 --> 00:43:11,253 isn't an isolated case. 873 00:43:12,280 --> 00:43:16,409 Regional airlines have boomed worldwide since the 1980s, 874 00:43:16,410 --> 00:43:18,209 particularly in the United States, 875 00:43:18,210 --> 00:43:20,439 where they account for half of all flights 876 00:43:20,440 --> 00:43:23,263 and carry 100 million passengers a year. 877 00:43:24,370 --> 00:43:26,799 In the rush to fulfill consumer demand 878 00:43:26,800 --> 00:43:28,429 for cheap air travel, 879 00:43:28,430 --> 00:43:31,869 these airlines often hire less experienced pilots, 880 00:43:31,870 --> 00:43:33,699 and pay them far lower salaries 881 00:43:33,700 --> 00:43:35,933 than their counterparts at major carriers. 882 00:43:36,970 --> 00:43:40,823 Some even neglect to test their pilots for basic skills. 883 00:43:43,160 --> 00:43:47,689 There is no such thing as compulsory pilot assessment 884 00:43:47,690 --> 00:43:48,999 before they get hired. 885 00:43:49,000 --> 00:43:50,796 Does not exist. 886 00:43:54,280 --> 00:43:57,869 Colgan Air in February of 2009, 887 00:43:57,870 --> 00:44:00,779 one of its planes crashed in Buffalo, New York, 888 00:44:00,780 --> 00:44:01,993 killing 50 people. 889 00:44:04,490 --> 00:44:06,369 The accident was blamed on the actions 890 00:44:06,370 --> 00:44:07,893 of an inexperienced crew, 891 00:44:08,820 --> 00:44:12,149 an eerie reminder of the Crossair disaster. 892 00:44:12,150 --> 00:44:14,659 It underlined the urgency of improving oversight 893 00:44:14,660 --> 00:44:16,003 of smaller carriers. 894 00:44:19,540 --> 00:44:20,599 If you're making a product 895 00:44:20,600 --> 00:44:21,659 for a large company, 896 00:44:21,660 --> 00:44:23,099 you make a mistake, 897 00:44:23,100 --> 00:44:25,089 you may lose part of the market. 898 00:44:25,090 --> 00:44:27,179 You may lose some clients. 899 00:44:27,180 --> 00:44:29,259 But an airline company can lose a plane, 900 00:44:29,260 --> 00:44:31,779 its crew, and passengers. 901 00:44:31,780 --> 00:44:33,293 The stakes are very different.